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Abstract
Weakly acyclic games form a natural generalization of the class of
games that have the finite improvement property (FIP). In such games
one stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement
path exists. We classify weakly acyclic games using the concept of a
scheduler introduced in [15]. We also show that finite games that can
be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response strategies are
weakly acyclic. Finally, we explain how the schedulers allow us to improve
the bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in a weakly acyclic game.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Given a strategic game, when we allow the players to improve their choices on
a unilateral basis, we are naturally brought to the concept of an improvement
path, in which at each stage a single player who did not select a best response is
allowed to select a better strategy. By definition every finite improvement path
terminates in a Nash equilibrium. This suggests the finite improvement property
(FIP), introduced in [13], according to which every improvement path is finite.
It is obviously a desired property of a game that in particular is satisfied by the
congestion games, as explained in [13].
However, the FIP is a very strong property and many natural games do not
satisfy it. In particular, [12] studied the congestion games in which the payoff
functions are players specific. These games do not have the FIP. Milchtaich
proved that such games belong to a larger class of games (essentially introduced
in [16]), called weakly acyclic games, in which one only stipulates that from any
initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists.
Weakly acyclic games have a natural appeal because the concept of an im-
provement path captures the idea of a possible ‘interaction’ resulting from play-
ers’ preference for better strategies and hence provides a link with distributed
computing. In particular, [5] introduced a natural class of weakly acyclic games,
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which model the routing aspects on the Internet. In turn, [11] showed that for
weakly acyclic games, a modification of the traditional no-regret algorithm yields
almost sure convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. Further, [6] proved that
the existence of a unique (pure) Nash equilibrium in every subgame implies that
the game is weakly acyclic.
1.2 Our work
If we view a strategic game as a distributed system in which the players attempt
to find a Nash equilibrium by means of a ‘better response (respectively, ‘best
response) dynamics’, then the property of being weakly acyclic only guarantees
that finding a Nash equilibrium is always possible. However, such an existence
guarantee does not help the players to find it. By adding to the game a sched-
uler , a concept introduced in [15], we ensure that the players always reach a
Nash equilibrium, by repeatedly interacting with it. A scheduler is simply a
function that given a finite sequence of joint strategies selects a player who can
improve his payoff in the last joint strategy. Each player interacts with the
scheduler by submitting to it a strategy he selected. Subsequently the scheduler
again selects a player who did not select a best response. This interaction pro-
cess leaves open how each player selects his better (respectively, best) strategy.
In the presence of a scheduler for a strategic gameG we can view the resulting
interaction as a ‘supergame’ between the central authority represented by the
scheduler and the players of G. The aim of the central authority is to reach
a Nash equilibrium in spite of a limited guarantee on the behaviour of the
players: all it can be sure of is that each selected player will select a better
response (respectively a best response). The resulting interaction results in
an improvement path (respectively a best response improvement path). If all
so generated improvement paths are finite, we say that the game respects the
scheduler.
By providing a classification of the schedulers we obtain a natural classifica-
tion of weakly acyclic games. An advantage of such a classification is that given
a weakly acyclic game we can determine under what adverse circumstances a
Nash equilibrium still can be reached. Consequently some existing results can
be improved. In particular, we show in Section 9 how we can strengthen our
result from [15] concerning a class of social network games. In turn, [4] strength-
ened the above mentioned theorem of [12] by showing that congestion games
with player specific payoff functions respect every local best response scheduler,
defined below in Section 3. Further, as we explain in Section 10, the existence
of a scheduler allows us to improve bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium.
In turn, a recent paper [9] demonstrates the applicability of schedulers in
order to improve bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of
network creation games proposed in [7]. The authors show that while an ar-
bitrary improvement path for the class of so-called MAX swap games on trees
might take O(n3) steps to converge to an Nash equilibrium, a natural scheduler
reduces the complexity to O(n log n) and moreover this bound is optimal.
In what follows we introduce eight natural categories of schedulers. They
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yield a classification of finite weakly acyclic games that consists of nine classes
games that for two player games collapse into five classes. Then we study finite
games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response
strategies (IENBR) and show that they are weakly acyclic. We also locate
where such games fit in our classification. Further, we define a modified notion
of a potential using which we characterize the games that respect a scheduler.
We also use this notion to reason about a natural class of coordination games.
Finally, we discuss the consequences of a fact that a game respects a scheduler.
2 Preliminaries
Assume a set N := {1, . . . , n} of players, where n > 1. A strategic game for
n players, written as (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists of a non-empty set Si of
strategies and a payoff function pi : S1 × · · · × Sn→ R, for each player i.
Fix a strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We denote S1 × · · · × Sn
by S, call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy, denote the ith element of s by
si, and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i. Occasionally we write (si, s−i)
instead of s. Finally, we abbreviate ×j 6=iSj to S−i.
We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of
his opponents if ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i). If si is (not) a best response
to s−i, we say that player i selected (did not select) a best response in s.
Next, we call a joint strategy s a (pure) Nash equilibrium if each si is a best
response to s−i, that is, if ∀i ∈ N ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i). We also
define
BR(s) := {i | player i selected a best response in s},
NBR(s) := {i | player i did not select a best response in s}.
Further, we call a strategy s′i of player i a better response given a joint
strategy s if pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i). Following [13] a path in S is a sequence
(s1, s2, . . .) of joint strategies such that for every k > 1 there is a player i
such that sk = (s′i, s
k−1
−i ) for some s
′
i 6= s
k−1
i . A path is called an improve-
ment path (respectively, a best response improvement path, in short a
BR-improvement path) if it is maximal and for all k > 1, pi(sk) > pi(sk−1)
(respectively, ski is a best response to s
k−1
−i ), where i is the player who deviated
from sk−1. So in an improvement path each deviating player selects a better
response, while in a BR-improvement path each deviating player selects a best
response. Given a finite prefix ρ of a path in S, we denote by ρ∗ the infinite
path generated by the repeated concatenation of ρ.
The better response graph (respectively, the best response graph) as-
sociated with the game G is defined as (S,→), where s → s′ if (s, s′) is a step
in an improvement path (respectively, in an BR-improvement path).
Given joint strategies s, s′ ∈ S and a player i we define
s
i
→s′ iff s−i = s′−i and pi(s
′) > pi(s),
s
i
⇒s′ iff s
i
→s′ and s′i is a best response to s
′
−i.
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Recall that G has the finite improvement property (FIP), (respectively,
the finite best response property (FBRP)) if every improvement path (re-
spectively, every BR-improvement path) is finite. Obviously, if a game has the
FIP or the FBRP, then it has a Nash equilibrium —it is the last element of each
path. Following [16, 12] we call a strategic game weakly acyclic (respectively,
BR-weakly acyclic) if for any joint strategy there exists a finite improvement
path (respectively, BR-improvement path) that starts at it.
In Section 6 we shall combine two n players gamesG := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn)
and G′ := (S′1, . . . , S
′
n, p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n) such that S1 ∩S
′
1 = ∅ by means of the follow-
ing operation:
G ⊎G′ := (S1 ∪ S
′
1, . . . , Sn ∪ S
′
n, r1, . . . , rn),
where
ri(s) :=


pi(s) if s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn
p′i(s) if s ∈ S
′
1 × · · · × S
′
n
0 otherwise
The ⊎ operation is obviously associative, so it is justified to use ⊎ as an k-ary
operator on n players games.
3 Schedulers
In what follows we introduce some classes of weakly acyclic games. They are
defined in terms of schedulers. By a scheduler we mean a function f that
given finite sequence s1, . . ., sk of joint strategies that does not end in a Nash
equilibrium selects a player who did not select in sk a best response. In practice
schedulers will be applied only to initial prefixes of improvement paths.
Consider an improvement path ρ = (s1, s2, . . .). We say that ρ respects a
scheduler f if for all k smaller than the length of ρ we have sk+1 = (s′i, s
k
−i),
where f(s1, . . ., sk) = i. We say that a strategic game respects a scheduler
f if all improvement paths ρ which respect f are finite. Further, we say that
a strategic game respects a BR-scheduler f if all BR-improvement paths ρ
which respect f are finite.
In what follows we study various types of schedulers. We say that a scheduler
f is state-based if for some function g : S→N we have
f(s1, . . ., sk) = g(sk).
We say that a function g : P(N)→N is a choice function if for all A 6= ∅
we have g(A) ∈ A. Next, we say that a scheduler f is set-based if for some
choice function g : P(N)→N
f(s1, . . ., sk) = g(NBR(sk)).
Finally, we say that a set-based scheduler f is local if the above choice function
g satisfies the following property:
if g(A) ∈ B ⊆A then g(A) = g(B). (1)
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A simple way of producing choice functions g : P(N)→N that satisfy (1)
is the following. Take a permutation pi of 1, . . ., n and define for A 6= ∅
[pi](A) := pi(k),
where k is the smallest element of N such that pi(k) ∈ A. That is, [pi](A) is the
first element on the list pi(1), . . ., pi(n) that belongs to A.
To simplify notation, we often view a set based scheduler as f : P(N)→N
by equating it to the corresponding choice function. In Section 9 we shall need
the following characterization result.
Proposition 1 A choice function g : P(N)→N satisfies (1) iff it is of the
form [pi] for some permutation pi of 1, . . ., n.
Proof. Suppose a choice function g : P(N)→N satisfies (1). Define a permu-
tation pi of 1, . . ., n inductively as follows:
pi(1) := g(N), pi(2) := g(N \ {pi(1)}), . . ., pi(n) := g(N \ {pi(1), . . ., pi(n− 1)}).
Take now a nonempty subset A of N . Let pi(k) = [pi](A). By definition
{pi(1), . . ., pi(k − 1)} ∩A = ∅ and pi(k) ∈ A. Let B := N \ {pi(1), . . ., pi(k − 1)}.
By definition g(B) = pi(k). Further, A⊆B and pi(k) ∈ A, so by property (1)
we have g(A) = g(B) = [pi](A).
Next, it is straightforward to check that each function [pi] satisfies (1). ✷✷
The games that respect schedulers satisfy obvious implications that we sum-
marize in Figure 1. Here FIP (respectively, FBRP) stands for the class of
games that have the FIP (respectively, FBRP), WA (respectively, BRWA) for
the class of weakly acyclic games (respectively, BR-weakly acyclic games), Sched
(respectively, SchedBR) stands for the class of games that respect a scheduler
(respectively, a BR-scheduler), etc. In what follows we clarify which implications
can be reversed.
FIP +3❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴ Local +3❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴

✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤ Set
+3❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴

✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤ State
+3❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴

✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤ Sched
+3❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴

✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤ WAKS
✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤
FBRP +3❴❴❴❴

✤✤✤
✤✤✤
LocalBR +3❴❴❴❴ SetBR +3❴❴❴❴ StateBR +3❴❴❴❴ SchedBR +3❴❴❴❴ BRWA
Figure 1: Dependencies between various classes of weakly acyclic games
4 Schedulers versus state-based schedulers
We prove here three implications which show that the classes of games SchedBR,
Sched, State and StateBR coincide.
Theorem 2 (Sched ⇒ State) If a game respects a scheduler, then it respects
a state-based scheduler.
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Proof. Fix a finite strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). Let Y :=
∪k∈NYk, where
• Y0 := {s ∈ S | s is a Nash equilibrium},
• Yk+1 := Yk ∪ {s | ∃i ∀s′(s
i
→s′ ⇒ s′ ∈ Yk)}.
For each s ∈ Yk+1\Yk, let fState(s) := i, where i is such that ∀s′(s
i
→s′ → s′ ∈ Yk).
If Y = S, then we can view fState as a state-based scheduler. We now prove
two claims concerning the set Y and the scheduler fState.
Claim 1 If a strategic game G respects a scheduler, then Y = S.
Proof. Suppose that G respects a scheduler f . Assume by contradiction that
Y 6= S. Take s0 ∈ S \Y . Suppose f(s0) = i1. By the definition of Y there exists
a joint strategy s1 such that s0
i1→s1 and s1 ∈ S \ Y . Suppose f((s0, s1)) = i2.
Again, by the definition of Y there exists a joint strategy s2 such that s1
i2→s2
and s2 ∈ S \ Y . Iterating this argument we construct an infinite improvement
path which respects f , which yields a contradiction. ✷ ✷
Claim 2 If for a strategic game G we have Y = S, then G respects fState.
Proof. We prove by induction on k that all improvements paths that start in
a joint strategy from Yk and respect fState are finite.
The claim holds vacuously for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k ≥ 0. Take
some s ∈ Yk+1 \ Yk and an improvement path ξ that respects fState and starts
in s. Suppose that fState(s) := i. Then for some s′, s
i
→s′ is the first step in ξ.
By the definition of fState, s′ ∈ Yk, so by the induction hypothesis ξ is finite. ✷
✷
Suppose now that a game G respects a scheduler. By Claim 1 Y = S, so
fState is a state-based scheduler. By Claim 2, G respects fState.
The proof for arbitrary games is a minor modification of the above argument
and uses a transfinite induction to construct the set of strategies Y and to reason
about it. We omit the details. ✷ ✷
The above proof uses a construction similar to the one used to compute the
winning regions of reachability games, see, e.g., [8, page 104].
Theorem 3 (SchedBR ⇒ StateBR) If a game respects a BR-scheduler, then
it respects a state-based BR-scheduler.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 2 with the relation
i
⇒ used
instead of
i
→. ✷ ✷
Theorem 4 (SchedBR ⇒ Sched) If a finite game respects a BR-scheduler,
then it respects a scheduler.
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Proof. The idea of the proof is as follows. Suppose that a game respects a
BR-scheduler fBR. We construct then a scheduler f inductively by repeatedly
scheduling the same player until he plays a best response, and subsequently
scheduling the same player as fBR does.
To make it precise we need some notation. We call an initial prefix of
an improvement path an improvement sequence. To indicate the deviating
players at each step of an improvement sequence (s0, . . ., sk) we shall write it
alternatively as
s0
i1→s1
i2→. . .
ik→sk.
Given an improvement sequence ξ we denote by [ξ]BR the subsequence of it
obtained by deleting the joint strategies that do not result from a selection of a
best response. In general [ξ]BR is not a improvement sequence (for example, it
does not need to be a maximal sequence), but it is if every maximal subsequence
of it of the form s0
i
→s1
i
→. . .
i
→sm ends with a selection of a best response.
Given a finite sequence of joint strategies ξ we denote its last element by
last(ξ) and denote the extension of ξ by a joint strategy s by ξ, s. We define the
desired scheduler f inductively by the length of the sequences. For a sequence
of length 1, so a joint strategy that is not a Nash equilibrium, we put
f(s) := fBR(s).
Suppose now that we defined f on all sequences of length k. Consider a
sequence ξ, s of length k + 1. If ξ, s is not an improvement path or last(ξ)
f(ξ)
→ s
does not hold, then we define f(ξ, s) arbitrarily. Otherwise we put
f(ξ, s) :=
{
fBR([ξ, s]BR) if si is a best response to s−i
f(ξ) otherwise
We claim that G respects the scheduler f . To see it take an improvement
path ξ that respects f . By the definition of f , [ξ]BR is an improvement sequence
that respects fBR. By assumption [ξ]BR is finite, so ξ is finite, as well. ✷ ✷
Note that the above theorem fails to hold for infinite games. Indeed, consider
a two player game ({0}, [0, 1], p1, p2), where [0, 1] stands for the real interval
{r | 0 ≤ r ≤ 1} and p1(0, s2) = p2(0, s2) := s2. Then 1 is a unique best response
of player 2 to the strategy 0, so this game respects the unique BR-scheduler.
However, it does not respect the unique scheduler.
5 Two player games
For two player games more implications hold.
Proposition 5 (Sched ⇒ FBRP) If a two player game respects a scheduler,
then every BR-improvement path is finite.
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Proof. Suppose that a two player game G respects a scheduler. Note that the
best response graph of G has the property that for every node s that is not a
source node, the set NBR(s) has at most one element. Take a BR-improvement
path ξ. Suppose that (s, s′) is the first step in ξ and that η is the suffix of ξ
that starts at s′. Then every element s′′ of η is such that the set NBR(s′′) has
at most one element. Hence η respects any scheduler and consequently is finite.
So ξ is finite, as well. ✷ ✷
We also have the following examples showing that other implications do not
hold.
Example 1 (Local 6⇒ FIP) Consider the following game
L C R
T 1, 0 0, 1 0, 2
B 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
It respects the local scheduler f for which f({1, 2}) = 2. However, this game
does not have the FIP. ✷
Example 2 (State 6⇒ Set, FBRP 6⇒ Set) Consider the game
A B C
A 2, 2 2, 0 0, 1
B 0, 2 1, 1 1, 0
C 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
In Figure 2 we display the better response graph and the best response
graphs associated with it.
(A,A) (A,B)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (A,C)
✤
✤✤
✤✤
ww
(B,A)
OO✤✤✤✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤✤
(B,B)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
OO✤✤✤✤✤
(B,C)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
vv
(C,A)
AA
//❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (C,B)
__
OO✤✤✤✤✤
(C,C)
OO✤✤✤✤✤
oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
(A,A) (A,B)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (A,C)
✤
✤✤
✤✤
ww
(B,A)
OO✤✤✤✤✤
(B,B)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
OO✤✤✤✤✤
(B,C)
vv
(C,A)
AA
//❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (C,B)
__
(C,C)
OO✤✤✤✤✤
oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Better response and best response graphs
First we show that this game respects a state-based scheduler. To define it
suffices to consider the joint strategies in which none of the players selected a
best response. These are (A,C), (C,A), (B,B) and (C,C). We put
f(A,C) := 2, f(C,A) := 1, f(B,B) := 1, f(C,C) := 1.
(f(B,B) := 2 and f(C,C) := 2 would do, as well.)
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Using Figure 2(a) it is easy to check that any improvement path that respects
this scheduler ends in (A,A). Further, the graph given in Figure 2(b) is acyclic,
that is, this game has the FBRP.
However, this game does not respect any set-based scheduler. Indeed, sup-
pose otherwise. Then such a scheduler is defined using a choice function g. If
g({1, 2}) = 1, then the infinite improvement path ((B,B), (A,B), (A,C), (B,C))∗
respects this scheduler. In turn, if g({1, 2}) = 2, then the infinite improvement
path ((B,B), (B,A), (C,A), (C,B))∗ respects this scheduler. ✷
Example 3 (BRWA 6⇒ SchedBR) Consider the following game
L C R
T 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1
B 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
It is BR-weakly acyclic. However, this game respects no BR-scheduler. In-
deed, there is only one scheduler for this game and the following infinite im-
provement path respects it:
((T, L), (B,L), (B,C), (T,C))∗.
✷
Example 4 (WA 6⇒ BRWA) Consider now the following game
L C R
T 0, 2 1, 0 0, 1
M 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0 1, 0
It is weakly acyclic. However, it is not BR-weakly acyclic, because the
infinite BR-improvement path ((T, L), (M,L), (M,C), (T,C))∗ is a unique
BR-improvement path starting at (T, L). ✷
By definition if a two player game respects a set-based scheduler, then it
respects a local scheduler. So putting together the results obtained so far we
get the implications and equivalences depicted in Figure 3. All implications are
proper.
FIP +3❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴ Local,Set +3❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴
FBRP,LocalBR,SetBR,
State,StateBR,
Sched,SchedBR
+3❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴ BRWA +3❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴ WA
Figure 3: Classification of two player finite weakly acyclic games
As an illustration consider a two player congestion game with player-specific
payoff functions (actually a class of games) analyzed in [12, page 115]. Each
player has three strategies numbered 1, 2, and 3. We omit the description of the
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game and mention only its relevant characteristics. The game has two Nash equi-
libria, (1, 2) and (2, 1), and an infinite improvement path ((3, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3),
(1, 3), (1, 1), (3, 1))∗. Additionally p1(1, 2) > p1(1, 1), p1(1, 2) > p1(2, 2), and
p2(2, 1) > p2(2, 3).
This implies that the graph depicted in Figure 4 is a subgraph of the better
response graph of the game. The dotted edges are implied by the fact that
(1, 2) and (2, 1) are Nash equilibria, the continuous edges correspond to the
infinite improvement path, while the dashed edges are implied by the mentioned
properties of the payoff functions. The relation between the nodes (2, 1) and
(3, 1) and the status of edges involving (3, 3) are unspecified, though the edge
(2, 1)→ (3, 1) is excluded since (2, 1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that this game respects a set-based scheduler g such that g({1, 2}) = 2.
Indeed, this choice allows us to ‘exit’ the infinite improvement path both at
(1, 1), (2, 2) and (2, 3). One can also check that this choice properly takes
care of any legal completion of the graph depicted in Figure 4 to a possible
better response graph. For instance, addition of the edges (3, 2) → (3, 3) and
(3, 3) → (2, 3) would create another infinite improvement path that would be
‘exited’ at (1, 1). We conclude that each game with the above characteristics
belongs to Set \ FIP. Figure 3 implies that each such game also belongs to
FBRP.
(1,1) //❴❴❴❴❴


(1,2) (1,3)oo
ww
(2,1) (2,2)oo
OO✤
✤
✤
//❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (2,3)
OO✤✤✤✤✤
vv ❙
❲❬❴❝❣
❦
(3,1) //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (3,2)
]]
OO✤✤✤✤✤
(3,3)
Figure 4: Subgraph of a better response graph
6 Remaining implications
To deal with the remaining implications we need games with at least three
players.
Example 5 (LocalBR 6⇒ FBRP) We consider a three player game in which
every player has two strategies, 0 and 1, and such that its best response graph
is as shown in Figure 5.
To define the corresponding payoff functions we just need to interpret each di-
rected edge (a, b, c)→ (a, b′, c) as the statement p2(a, b, c) = 0 and p2(a, b′, c) =
1, each dotted edge (a, b, c) − −(a, b′, c) as the statement p2(a, b, c) = 0 and
p2(a, b′, c) = 0, and similarly for the other edges. This yields
p1(0, 1, 1) = p1(1, 0, 1) = p2(0, 0, 1) = p2(1, 1, 1) = p3(1, 0, 0) := 1,
10
(0,1,1)
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧
(1,1,1)oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
(0,0,1) //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ (1,0,1)
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
(0,1,0) ❴❴ ❴❴ (1,1,0)
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
(0,0,0) ❴❴❴❴
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
⑧
⑧
⑧
(1,0,0)
⑧
⑧
⑧
Figure 5: A best response graph
with the remaining payoffs equal to 0.
This game respects any local BR-scheduler f for which f({2, 3}) = 3. How-
ever, this game does not have the FBRP. ✷
Example 6 (Set 6⇒ Local, SetBR 6⇒ LocalBR) We first construct four three
player games. Every player in each game has two strategies, 0 and 1. The
better response graphs of these games are depicted in Figure 6. To define the
corresponding payoff functions we proceed as in Example 5.
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Figure 6: Four better response graphs
Next, we make for each player his strategy sets in these four games mutually
disjoint by renaming the strategies 0 and 1 in the ith game to 0i and 1i. Denote
the resulting games by G1, . . ., G4. Let G := G1 ⊎ G2 ⊎ G3 ⊎ G4. In the
better response graph of G there are precisely three loops that correspond to
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the ones depicted in Figure 6. Using this figure one can check that G respects
the following set-based scheduler:
f({2, 3}) := 3, f({1, 3}) := 1, f({1, 2}) := 2,
with an arbitrary value for the input {1, 2, 3}.
However, G does not respect any local scheduler, since to ‘exit’ each of these
three loops each set-based scheduler needs to make the above selections, and
then no selection for the input {1, 2, 3} can make the scheduler local.
The above reasoning also holds for the BR-schedulers, since every better
response in G is also a best response, as all payoffs in G are either 0 or 1. ✷
Example 7 (StateBR 6⇒ SetBR) We first construct two three player games.
Every player in each game has two strategies, 0 and 1. The best response
graphs of these games are depicted in Figure 7. The first one coincides with the
first better response graph of Figure 6.
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Figure 7: Two best response graphs
Denote these games by G1 and G2 and let G := G1 ⊎G2. Then G respects
the following state-based BR-scheduler (we use here the same renaming of the
strategies as in Example 6):
f(11, 01, 11) := 3, f(12, 02, 12) := 2.
However, G does not respect any set-based BR-scheduler, since in each of the
above two joint strategies the set of players who did not select a best response is
the same (namely {2, 3}), and to ‘exit’ each of the two loops in the corresponding
best response graphs one needs to take the above choices. ✷
This brings us to the following final diagram depicted in Figure 8. All
implications are proper.
7 Games that can be solved by the iterated elim-
ination of NBR
Weakly acyclic games are of natural interest because they have (pure) Nash
equilibria. In the literature another class of finite games has been studied with
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Figure 8: Classification of finite weakly acyclic games
the same property, namely those that can be solved by the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies. In what follows we focus on a more general
class of finite games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best
responses (IENBR), where we limit ourselves to never best responses to joint
pure strategies of the opponents.
In this context the joint pure strategies of the opponents are usually called
point beliefs and the outcome of IENBR is the set of rationalizable joint
strategies, see [3]. In other words, we focus on finite game that have a unique
rationalizable joint strategy w.r.t. point beliefs.
Given a strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) we say that a strategy
si ∈ Si is a never best response in G if for every s−i ∈ S−i there is a strategy
s′i ∈ Si such that pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
To better understand the concept of a never best response recall that given
a finite strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) amixed strategy for player
i is a probability distribution over Si. Further, recall that a strategy si ∈ Si is
strictly dominated by a mixed strategy if there exists a mixed strategy mi
such that for all s−i ∈ S−i, pi(mi, s−i) > pi(si, s−i), where pi(mi, s−i) is defined
in the expected way.
Then it is straightforward to check that if si is strictly dominated by a mixed
strategy then si is a never best response. Also, the reverse implication does not
hold.
Given a binary relation→ we denote by →∗ its transitive reflexive closure.
In what follows we consider a specific relation → between games defined as
follows:
G→G′
where G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), G′ = (S′1, . . . , S
′
n, p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n) is a proper
subgame of G, and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀si ∈ Si \ S′i ¬∃s−i ∈ S−i si is a best response to s−i in S.
That is, G→G′ when G′ results from G by removing from it some strategies
that are never best responses.
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If for some game G′ in which each player is left with exactly one strategy we
have G→∗ G′, then we say that G can be solved by the iterated elimination of
never best responses, in short can be solved by IENBR.
The games that can be solved by IENBR are of interest because of the
following observation.
Proposition 6 If a finite game can be solved by IENBR then it has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It suffices to note that each step of the elimination process maintains
the set of Nash equilibria. ✷ ✷
We now prove that this class of games is actually contained in the class of
weakly acyclic games. More precisely, the following holds.
Theorem 7 If a finite game can be solved by IENBR, then it is in StateBR.
Proof. We use the scheduler f which schedules each time the player who did
not play a best response the longest, breaking ties in favour of the player with
the smallest index. Fix a finite game G that can be solved by IENBR. By
definition of the scheduler f , it satisfies the following property:
(P1) for all i ∈ N , for every BR-improvement path ρ = s0, s1, . . . in G that
respects f and for all j ≥ 0, there exists k ≥ j such that i ∈ BR(sk).
Let ρ = s0, s1, . . . a BR-improvement path which respects f . We argue that
ρ is finite.
We find it useful to introduce the following notion: a finite sequence of
strategy profiles b = s0, . . . , sk is called a block if for all i ∈ NBR(s0), there
exists j ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that either i ∈ BR(sj) or i ∈ f(s0, . . . , sj). The
sequence b is said to be minimal if there is no prefix b′ of b such that b′ is a
block. Since f satisfies (P1), we can represent the best response improvement
path ρ as a concatenation of minimal blocks b0, b1, . . ..
Since G can be solved by IENBR, there is a finite reduction sequence ξ =
G0 → G1 → . . .→ Gm for G such that each player is left with a single strategy
in Gm. By Theorem 4.2 in [1] we can assume without loss of generality that each
reduction step eliminates a single strategy. Let (i1, si1), (i2, si2), . . . , (im, sim) be
the corresponding sequence of pairs of player identity and of the strategy which
are eliminated in ξ. Consider the first pair (i1, si1) and the block b
0 = s0, . . . , sl.
We have two cases:
• s0i1 = si1 .
Then i1 ∈ NBR(s0). Indeed, since si1 is a never best response, i1 ∈
NBR(s) for any s ∈ S. Since f satisfies (P1) and si1 is a never best
response there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , l} such that i1 ∈ f(s0, . . . , sj). Therefore
s
j+1
i1
6= si1 . Again, since si1 is a never best response player i never switches
back to si1 in the suffix of ρ starting in s
j irrespective of the strategies
chosen by the other players.
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• s0i 6= si1 .
Then since si1 is a never best response, player i1 never switches to si1 in
the improvement path ρ, irrespective of the strategies chosen by the other
players.
Therefore in the suffix ρ1 = b1, b2, b3, . . . of the improvement path ρ the strategy
si1 is never chosen. This means that ρ
1 is a best response improvement path in
the restricted game G1. Now consider the pair (i2, si2) and the block b
1. By the
same argument as above, we can show that in the suffix ρ2 = b2, b3, . . . of the
improvement path ρ, the strategy si2 is never chosen and therefore ρ
2 is a best
response improvement path in the restricted game G2. Since G can be solved by
the elimination sequence ξ = G0, G1, . . . , Gm, by iterating the above argument
we get that there is a suffix of the improvement path ρ which involves only joint
strategies in Gm. Since in Gm each player is left with a single strategy, ρ is
finite.
We conclude that the game G respects the BR-scheduler f . Consequently,
by Theorem 3, G is in StateBR. ✷ ✷
In particular, in view of the remarks at the beginning of this section, if a
game can be solved by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (by
a mixed strategy), in short, IESDS, then it is weakly acyclic. An example of
such a game is the beauty contest game due to [14]. In this game there
are n > 2 players, each with the set of strategies equal {1, . . . , 100}. Each
player submits a number and the payoff to each player is obtained by splitting
1 equally between the players whose submitted number is closest to 23 of the
average. For example, if the submissions are 29, 32, 29, then the payoffs are
respectively 12 , 0,
1
2 . By Theorem 7 this game is weakly acyclic.
Note that the implication in the above theorem cannot be reversed. Indeed,
the game given in Example 7 is in StateBR and it is easy to check that it cannot
be solved by IENBR, as every strategy in this game is a best response. An even
simpler example is the well-known Battle of Sexes game.
We now identify the smallest class used in our classification of finite weakly
acyclic games that includes all finite games that can be solved by IENBR. We
begin with two player games for which we have the classification presented in
Figure 3 of Section 5. In view of this, it suffices to note the following example.
Example 8 (IENBR 6⇒ Set) Consider the game
A B C
A 3, 2 1, 1 2, 0
B 1, 2 3, 1 1, 2
C 2, 2 2, 3 1, 1
and its better response graph displayed in Figure 9.
It is easy to see that this game can be solved by IENBR and that the outcome
is (A,A). However, this game does not respect any set-based scheduler. Indeed,
suppose otherwise. Then such a scheduler is defined using a choice function g. If
g({1, 2}) = 1, then the infinite improvement path ((A,B), (B,B), (B,C), (C,C))∗
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Figure 9: A better response graph
respects this scheduler. In turn, if g({1, 2}) = 2, then the infinite improvement
path ((C,A), (C,B), (B,B), (B,A))∗ respects this scheduler. ✷
The case of arbitrary games is more complicated. First we show how given
two n player gamesG1 := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) andG2 := (S′1, . . . , S
′
n, r1, . . . , rn),
where S1∩S′1 = ∅, that have strictly positive payoffs and both can be solved by
IENBR, we can construct using an auxiliary game G3 a game G := G1⊎G2⊎G3
that also can be solved by IENBR.
Suppose that the outcomes of the IENBR applied to the games G1 and G2
are respectively the joint strategies (s1, . . ., sn) and (s′1, . . ., s
′
n). Further, assume
that a 6∈ S1 ∪ S′1. Let G3 := ({a}, S2 ∪ S
′
2, . . . , Sn ∪ S
′
n, u1, . . . , un), where the
ui payoff functions are defined in such a way that
• the NBR eliminations steps applied to G1 remain valid in the context of
G,
• the same holds for the game G2,
• the resulting game ({a, s1, s′1}, {s2, s
′
2}, . . . , {sn, s
′
n}, u1, . . . , un) can be solved
by IENBR.
The first two items can be achieved by ensuring that for each i ∈ {2, . . ., n}
and each eliminated strategy s′′i ∈ (Si ∪ S
′
i) \ {si, s
′
i} is not a best response to a
joint strategy s−i in G with s1 = a. We thus stipulate that
ui(a, s−1) := 0, when si ∈ (Si ∪ S′i) \ {si, s
′
i} for some i ∈ {2, . . ., n}.
To solve the game ({a, s1, s′1}, {s2, s
′
2}, . . . , {sn, s
′
n}, u1, . . . , un) by IENBR
we first stipulate that the strategies s1 and s′1 are strictly dominated in it by a.
We thus stipulate that
u1(a, s−1) := max+1, when s−1 ∈ ×j 6=1{sj, s′j},
where max is the maximum payoff used in G1 or G2.
To ensure that the game ({a}, {s2, s′2}, . . . , {sn, s
′
n}, u1, . . . , un) can be solved
by IENBR we further stipulate that for i ∈ {2, . . ., n}
ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i), where s−i ∈ {a} ×j 6=i,j 6=1 {sj, s
′
j}.
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Then for any payoff functions u1, . . ., un that satisfy the above conditions
the outcome of the IENBR applied to above game G yields the joint strategy
(a, s2, . . ., sn).
We now proceed with the following example.
Example 9 (IENBR 6⇒ LocalBR) First, consider Figure 10.
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Figure 10: A best response graph
It depicts the best response graph of a three player game G1. We define the
payoff functions analogously to Example 5. Note that this game can be solved
by IENBR with the outcome being the joint strategy (0, 0, 0).
Further, this game respects a set-based BR-scheduler f iff
f({1, 3}) = 3 or f({2, 3}) = 3.
So it does not respect the local BR-schedulers that correspond to the permuta-
tions 1, 2, 3 and 2, 1, 3.
By renaming the players we obtain two other games, G2 and G3, that both
can be solved by IENBR and such that G2 does not respect the local BR-
schedulers that correspond to the permutations 1, 3, 2 and 3, 1, 2 and G3 does
not respect the local BR-schedulers that correspond to the permutations 3, 2, 1
and 2, 3, 1. Using the construction explained prior to this example twice we
construct then a game G that can be solved by IENBR and that does not
respect any local BR-scheduler. ✷
So this example shows that the class of finite games that can be solved by
IENBR is not contained in LocalBR. We suspect that in fact this class is not
contained in SetBR, however were not able to prove it.
8 Potentials
To characterize the finite games that have the FIP [13] introduced the concept of
a (generalized ordinal) potential. We now introduce an appropriately modified
notion to characterize the games that respect a scheduler. We shall use it in the
next section to reason about a natural class of games.
Consider a game (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) and a scheduler f . We say that a
function F : S→ R is an f-potential (respectively, an f-BR-potential) if for
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every initial prefix of an improvement path (respectively, an BR-improvement
path) (s1, . . ., sk, sk+1) that respects f we have F (sk+1) > F (sk).
Note that when f is a state-based scheduler, then a function F is an f -
potential iff for all i, s′i and s
if f(s) = i and pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i), then F (s
′
i, s−i) > F (si, s−i),
and similarly for the f -BR-potentials. In the proof below we use the following
classic result of [10].
Lemma 8 (König’s Lemma) Any finitely branching tree is either finite or it
has an infinite path.
Theorem 9 Consider a finite game G.
(i) G respects a scheduler f iff an f -potential exists.
(ii) G respects a BR-scheduler f iff an f -BR-potential exists.
Proof. (i) (⇒ ) Consider a branching tree the root of which has all joint
strategies as successors, the non-root elements of which are joint strategies, and
whose branches are the improvement paths that respect f . Because the game is
finite this tree is finitely branching. By König’s Lemma this tree is finite, so we
conclude that the number of improvement paths that respect f is finite. Given
a joint strategy s define F (s) to be the number of improvement sequences (in
the sense of the proof of Theorem 4) that respect f and that terminate in s.
Clearly F is an f -potential.
(⇐ ) Let F be an f -potential. Suppose by contradiction that an infinite im-
provement path that respects f exists. Then the corresponding values of F form
a strictly increasing infinite sequence. This is a contradiction, since there are
only finitely many joint strategies.
The proof of (ii) is analogous. ✷ ✷
The argument given in (i)(⇒ ) follows the proof of [12] of the fact that every
game that has the FIP has a generalized ordinal potential. Note that when the
range of the f -potential is finite the implications (⇐) in (i) and (ii) also hold
for infinite games.
9 Cyclic coordination games
In coordination games the players need to coordinate their strategies in order
to choose among multiple pure Nash equilibria. Here we consider a natural set
up according to which the players are arranged in a directed simple cycle and
the payoff functions can yield three values: 0 if one chooses a ‘noncommitting’
strategy, 1 if one coordinates with the neighbour and −1 otherwise. We call
such games cyclic coordination games. They are special cases of strategic
games introduced in [15] that are naturally associated with social networks built
over arbitrary weighted directed graphs.
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More precisely, let Gcoord = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) be a (possibly infinite)
strategic game in which there is a special strategy t0 ∈
⋂
i∈N Si common to all
the players. For i ∈ N , let i⊕ 1 and i⊖ 1 denote the increment and decrement
operations done in cyclic order within {1, . . . , n}. That is, for i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1},
i ⊕ 1 = i + 1, n ⊕ 1 = 1, for i ∈ {2, . . ., n}, i ⊖ 1 = i − 1, and 1 ⊖ 1 = n. The
payoff functions are defined as,
pi(s) :=


0 if si = t0,
1 if si = si⊖1 and si 6= t0,
−1 otherwise.
Thus for each player i, and joint strategy s, the best response of i is to
choose si⊖1 if si⊖1 ∈ Si and t0 otherwise. Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium in
the game Gcoord iff it is is of the form (t, . . . , t).
We first show that cyclic coordination games are weakly acyclic. More pre-
cisely, we prove the following stronger result.
Theorem 10
(i) The game Gcoord has the FIP iff n = 2 or ∩i∈NSi = {t0}.
(ii) In Gcoord, starting from each joint strategy there exists an improvement
path of length at most n and a BR-improvement path of length at most
2n− 2.
We just noted that s is a Nash equilibrium in the game Gcoord iff it is is of the
form (t, . . . , t). So we can alternatively state item (i) as: The game Gcoord has
the FIP iff n = 2 or it has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (i) (⇒) As already mentioned when n = 2, Gcoord has the FIP. If n > 2,
then the above example implies that ∩i∈NSi = {t0}.
(⇐) Suppose that Gcoord does not have the FIP. Consider an infinite improve-
ment path ξ. Some player, say i, is selected in ξ infinitely often. This means
that player i selects in ξ some strategy t 6= t0 infinitely often. Indeed, otherwise
from some moment on in each joint strategy in ξ his strategy would be t0, which
is not the case.
Each time player i switches in ξ to the strategy t, the strategy of his pre-
decessor i ⊖ 1 is necessarily t, as well. So also player i ⊖ 1 switches in ξ to t
infinitely often. Iterating this reasoning we conclude that each player selects in
ξ the strategy t infinitely often. In particular t ∈ ∩i∈NSi.
(ii) Take a joint strategy s. Note that if all payoffs in s are ≥ 0, then s is a
Nash equilibrium. Suppose that some payoff in s is < 0. Then repeatedly select
the first player in the cyclic order whose payoff is negative and let him switch
to t0. After at most n steps the Nash equilibrium (t0, . . ., t0) is reached.
For the BR-improvement path we use the local scheduler f associated with
the identity permutation, i.e., we repeatedly schedule the first player in the
cyclic order who did not select a best response.
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Consider a joint strategy s taken from a BR-improvement path. Observe
that for all k if sk 6= t0 and pk(s) ≥ 0 (so in particular if sk is a best response
to s−k), then sk = sk⊖1. So for all i > 1, the following property holds:
Z(i): if f(s) = i and si−1 6= t0 then for all j ∈ {n, 1, . . ., i− 1}, sj = si−1.
In words: if i is the first player who did not select a best response and player
i − 1 strategy is not t0, then this is a strategy of every earlier player and of
player n.
Along each BR-improvement path that respects f the value of f(s) strictly
increases until the path terminates or at certain stage f(s) = n. Note that then
sn−1 = t0 since otherwise on the account of property Z(n) all players’ strategies
are equal, so s is a Nash equilibrium and hence f(s) is undefined. So the unique
best response for player n is t0. This switch begins a new round with player
1 as the next scheduled player. Player 1 also switches to t0 and from now on
every consecutive player switches to t0, as well. The resulting path terminates
once player n− 2 switches to t0.
Consequently the length of the generated BR-improvement path is at most
2n− 2. ✷ ✷
The proof of (ii) shows that each cyclic coordination game respects a specific
state-based scheduler and the local BR-scheduler associated with the identity
permutation. However, as the following theorem shows, a much stronger result
holds.
Theorem 11 Each coordination game Gcoord respects every local scheduler.
Proof. For n = 2, it is easy to see that Gcoord has the FIP and hence the result
follows. Therefore, assume that n > 2. We prove the result by showing that for
every local scheduler f , it is possible to associate an f -potential with the game
Gcoord.
Let f be a local scheduler. By Proposition 1, the choice function g associated
with f is of the form [pi] for some permutation pi of 1, . . ., n. Let l = pi(n) be
the last element in the permutation pi (this will be the only information about pi
that we shall rely upon). Let U := {−1, 0, 1}n and let F : S → U be a function
defined by F (s) := (pl(s), pl⊕1(s), pl⊕2(s), . . . , pl⊕(n−1)(s)).
For x ∈ U and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi denotes the i-th entry in x and as before,
x−1 = (x2, . . . , xn). We also use the notation F (s)[i] to denote the i-th entry in
the n-tuple F (s).
Let≺L be the strict counterpart of the lexicographic ordering over the (n−1)-
tuples of −1, 0, 1, where −1 ≺L 0 ≺L 1. We extend ≺L to a relation ✁ ⊆ U×U .
For x, y ∈ U such that x 6= y, x ✁ y if one of the following mutually exclusive
conditions holds:
C1 x1 ∈ {−1, 1} and y1 = 0,
C2 x1 = y1 = 0 and x−1 ≺L y−1,
C3 x1, y1 ∈ {−1, 1} and x−1 ≺L y−1,
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C4 x1, y1 ∈ {−1, 1}, x−1 = y−1 and x1 ≺L y1.
In other words, if the first entry of y is 0 and that of x is not 0, then x✁y. If
the first entry of both x and y is 0, then to order x and y we use the lexicographic
ordering over the (n − 1)-tuples x−1 and y−1. If the first entry of both x and
y is not 0, then again to order x and y we use the lexicographic ordering over
x−1 and y−1, the exception being when x−1 = y−1. In this case, to determine
the ordering we use the lexicographic ordering over x1 and y1.
Claim 3 The relation ✁ is a strict total ordering over U .
Assuming Claim 3, consider an initial prefix ξk+1 = (s1, . . . , sk, sk+1) of an
improvement path ξ that respects f . We claim that F (sk)✁ F (sk+1). We have
the following cases:
• f(sk) = l ⊕ i where i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Since ξ respects f , we have
pl⊕i(sk) < pl⊕i(sk+1), so F (sk)[i + 1] ≺L F (sk+1)[i + 1]. Since i 6= n, if
i > 1, then by the definition of the payoff functions, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i−
1}, pl⊕j(sk) = pl⊕j(sk+1). If i 6= n − 1, then pl(sk) = pl(sk+1) and it
immediately follows that F (sk)✁F (sk+1). Therefore, the interesting case
is when i = n− 1. Here we show that the first entry in F (sk+1) remains
0 after the update by player n− 1 iff the first entry in F (sk) is 0.
– If F (sk)[1] = 0, then F (sk+1)[1] = 0.
Indeed, suppose F (sk)[1] = 0. Since f(sk) 6= l, we have skl = s
k+1
l .
By the definition of the payoff function, for any joint strategy s,
pl(s) = 0 iff sl = t0. Thus irrespective of the choice of l⊕ (n− 1) we
have pl(sk+1) = 0, so F (sk+1)[1] = 0.
– If F (sk)[1] 6= 0, then F (sk+1)[1] 6= 0.
Suppose F (sk)[1] 6= 0. By the definition of the payoff functions,
skl 6= t0. Since f(s
k) 6= l, we have skl = s
k+1
l . Therefore irrespective
of the choice of l ⊕ (n− 1) we have pl(sk−1) 6= 0, so F (sk+1)[1] 6= 0.
Thus by conditions C2 and C3 in the definition of ✁, and the fact that
(F (sk))−1 ≺L (F (sk+1))−1, we indeed have F (sk)✁ F (sk+1).
• f(sk) = l. Since ξ respects f , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} we have l ⊕ i ∈
BR(sk). We claim that in this case, skl 6= t0 and s
k
l⊖1 = t0. Suppose not.
If skl = t0, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, l ⊕ i ∈ BR(s
k) implies that
skl⊕i = t0. This in turn implies that l ∈ BR(s
k), which is a contradiction.
If skl⊖1 6= t0, then we have the following two possibilities:
– skl⊖1 = s
k
l . This implies l ∈ BR(s
k), which is a contradiction.
– skl⊖1 6= s
k
l . Then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} such that s
k
l⊕j = s
k
l⊖1
and skl⊕(j−1) 6= s
k
l⊕j . Since s
k
l⊕j 6= t0, this implies that l⊕j 6∈ BR(s
k),
which is a contradiction.
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Now, if skl 6= t0, s
k
l⊖1 = t0 and pl(s
k) < pl(sk+1), then s
k+1
l = t0. By C1
in the definition of ✁, it then follows that F (sk)✁ F (sk+1).
Finally, since the set U which is the range of the function F is finite and
✁ is a strict total order on U , we can use an appropriate encoding e : U → R
such that u1 ✁ u2 iff e(u1) < e(u2). Then e(F (sk)) < e(F (sk+1)). So e ◦ F is
an f -potential. By the remark following Theorem 9 the result follows. ✷ ✷
Proof of Claim 3. Let x, y ∈ U such that x 6= y. We have the following cases.
• x1 ∈ {−1, 1} and y1 = 0. Then by C1, x✁ y.
• x1 = 0 and y1 = 0. Then by C2, if x−1 ≺L y−1 then x✁ y else y ✁ x.
• x1 = 0 and y1 ∈ {−1, 1}. Then by C1, y ✁ x.
• x1, y1 ∈ {−1, 1} and x−1 6= y−1. Then by C3, if x−1 ≺L y−1 then x ✁ y
else y ✁ x.
• x1, y1 ∈ {−1, 1} and x−1 = y−1. Then by C4, if x1 ≺L y1 then x✁ y else
y ✁ x.
Further, it can be verified that the relation ✁ is transitive by a straightforward
case analysis. ✷
Note that Theorem 11 cannot be extended to set-based schedulers. Indeed,
suppose that n > 2, and for some t 6= t0 we have t ∈ ∩i∈NSi. Consider the
joint strategy s := (t, t0, . . ., t0) and a set-based scheduler f such that for all
k ∈ {1, . . ., n}, f({k, k ⊕ 1}) := k ⊕ 1, f({k, k ⊕ 2}) := k, with arbitrary values
for other inputs. Then the following infinite improvement path respects this
scheduler. For the sake of readability we underlined the strategies that are not
best responses.
(t, t0, . . ., t0), (t, t, t0, . . ., t0), (t0, t, t0, . . ., t0), . . .
10 Bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium
Schedulers, apart of allowing us to classify weakly acyclic games are also useful
to improve bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium. We start with the following
simple observation.
Proposition 12 Consider a weakly acyclic game G for n players in which each
player has at most k strategies. Then starting from any joint strategy there exists
a finite improvement path of length at most kn.
Proof. Given a joint strategy s consider a finite improvement path ξ that starts
from it. If ξ has a fragment of the form s1, . . ., sk, s1, we can safely delete from
it the fragment s1, . . ., sk. Repeating this process we get a finite improvement
path that starts from s in which each joint strategy appears at most once. By
assumption there are at most kn joint strategies, which yields the claim. ✷ ✷
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In what follows, given a joint strategy s in a finite game G we focus on a
possibly infinite tree T (G, s) the root of which is s and the nodes of which are
joint strategies such that s′′ is a child of s′ if (s′, s′′) is a step in an improvement
path starting from s. We have the following result in which each step consists
of traversing an edge in the tree T (G, s).
Theorem 13 Consider a weakly acyclic game G for n players in which each
player has at most k strategies.
(i) Suppose that in each joint strategy each player has at most one better
response. Then in each tree T (G, s) a Nash equilibrium can be found in
O(nk
n
) steps.
(ii) If G respects a scheduler, then in each tree T (G, s) a Nash equilibrium can
be found in O(kn) steps.
Proof.
(i) By assumption each node in the tree T (G, s) has at most n successors.
Consequently, the subtree that consists of the nodes that lie at a level at most
m, where m > 0, has at most
∑m
i=0 n
i nodes. So to find a specific node in this
tree takes O(nm) steps. Putting m = kn, we get the claim on the account of
Proposition 12.
(ii) Suppose G respects a scheduler. By Theorem 2 G respects a state-based
scheduler f . Take an arbitrary joint strategy s and follow an improvement path
ξ that starts in s and respects f . By definition ξ is a finite path in T (G, s) that
starts from the root.
Suppose that some strategy appears more than once in ξ, i.e., ξ starts with
a fragment of the form s1, . . ., si, . . ., sj , si, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Then, since f is
a state-based scheduler, the infinite improvement path s1, . . ., si−1, (si, . . ., sj)∗
also respects f , which contradicts the assumption.
So each joint strategy appears at most once in ξ. Consequently, ξ is of length
at most kn, which establishes the claim. ✷ ✷
In total we introduced four classes of schedulers, the general ones, state-
based, set-based and local. To define a scheduler we need to describe its value
on all its inputs. This yields the progression given in Table 1. The last entry
is justified by Proposition 1 that allows us to describe a local scheduler by
specifying a single permutation of the numbers 1, . . ., n.
type of scheduler number of inputs
general infinite
state-based kn
set-based 2n
local n
Table 1: Input size of various schedulers
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